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SELECTIVE STRICT SCRUTINY - A NEW WAY
TO USE SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
Bruce Comly French*
THE PREMISE
As described herein, strict scrutiny is the Supreme Court's
tool to evaluate certain claims under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Building upon a concept of limitedjudicial intervention to protect politically powerless groups, the
Court has intervened to make the political process more effective
for the disadvantaged discrete group.
Strict scrutiny is thus applied when governmental actions
disfavor suspect groups or impair the full exercise of fundamental
rights. Of course, these terms are not self-defining, but only mean
something in the context of a specific governmental action directed
toward the disfavored group or right. As the doctrine developed,
classifications based upon race - normally the African-American
race - which served to disfavor African-Americans, were struck
down. Thus, the use of the racial classification in the context of
treating the African-American racial minority unfairly triggered
the salutary use of strict scrutiny. It was not race, per se, that was
the problem, but that the racial classification of disadvantaged
African-Americans in all aspects of their daily intercourse.
Race, whether adverse or beneficial, has essentially become
a non-permitted classifier. This development has turned the
Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Ada, Ohio. Much of the
author's thinking regarding the structuring this framework [of who votes on
what] should be the democratic principle of vesting citizens most interested
in governmental decisions with the authority to make them has been
influenced by my colleague, George D. Vaubel. Although his insights are
in the context of municipal home rule, the principle by analogy fits here as
well. George D. Vaubel, Democratic Government and Municipal Home
Rule, 19 STETSON L. REV. 813, 813 (1990). The excellent research and
analytical assistance of Stuart B. Chesky, R. Lee Grant, C. Shawn Kim, and
Robin Lilley are noted with appreciation. The excellent staff support and
editorial care of Shirley Steele are noted with appreciation.
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inherent logic and profound political insight of how strict scrutiny
began - political powerlessness - on its head. African-Americans,
having successfully benefited at the hands of the political majority
through enactments like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1975 with their various amendments, now
find that the Supreme Court has rewritten the racial classification
doctrine, again to the detriment of African-Americans.
Perhaps, the problem is that race is such a sensitive
political issue at the turn of the century that the judicial reaction
was inevitable. It may be that the broad use of suspect
classifications and the resultant strict scrutiny appear to infect so
many legislative matters that an overreaction was to be expected.
This article sets forth a modest, perhaps compromised,
proposal to retain the true vision of why strict scrutiny is
appropriate in some discrete situations, while at the same time
relying generally upon the impulses and operation of the majority
political process. For example, it may well be that African-
Americans can protect themselves politically in jurisdictions
wherein they constitute a significant political presence; in other
settings, it may be that scrutiny of a law hostile to African-
American interests would properly be evaluated under the stricter
standard. Similarly, the fact that persons with developmental
disabilities and their political allies might be able to obtain
favorable national legislation, would not preclude special treatment
when it comes to locating a group home in Texas.
But first, back to the beginning.
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS
April 25, 1938, the day on which the Supreme Court
announced its opinion and judgment in United States v. Carolene
Products, Co.1 was an otherwise unremarkable day. No other
decisions of the Court were rendered that day and little was made
of the decision immediately after its rendering.
The federal law prohibiting the shipment in "interstate
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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commerce of skimmed milk compounded with an, fat or oil other
than milk fat so as to resemble milk or cream. . ." was assailed as
transcending the power of the Congress under the Commerce
Clause and the Fifth Amendment. Short shrift was made of the
Commerce Clause challenge. 3 The rationality of the congressional
action was described as follows:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.4
It is as a footnote to the prior statement that the Court pens
its famous "footnote 4," worthy of recapitulation in its slightly
modified form: "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the fourteenth." 5
Further, "[i]t is unnecessary to consider now whether
legislation which restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
2 304 U.S. at 146 (describing the Filled Milk Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63
(1938)).
3 Id. at 147.
4 Id. at 152.
5 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-370 (1931); Lovell V.
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than
are most other types of legislation." 6 Such restrictions include
restrictions on the right to vote,7 restraints on the dissemination of
information, 8  interferences with political organizations, 9
prohibition of peaceable assembly, 10 review of statutes directed at
particular religious groups I ' and review of statutes directed at
racial minorities.
1 2
"[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. 13 It is interesting that the above
footnote was not accepted by Justice Black because of the
reasoning of the textual material. ' 4 Justices Cardozo and Reed took
no part in the consideration of the case.15 Justice Butler concurred
in the result and did not comment upon the footnote. 16 Justice
McReynolds dissented. 17 Thus, no more than four Justices agreed
6 See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932).
7 See Herndon, 273 U.S. at 536; see Condon, 286 U.S. at 73.
8 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713B714, 718-720, 722 (1931);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Lovell, 303 U.S. at
444.
See Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373-378 (1927); Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)
(Holmes, J.).
10 See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
11 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1935); Farrington v.
12 Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
Herndon, 273 U.S. at 536; Condon, 286 U.S. at 73.
13 Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428 (1819), with South
Carolina State Highway Dep' t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
304 U.S. at 155.
Id.
16 Id.
Id.
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with the footnote.
The profound insight articulated in the footnote identified
circumstances where a narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality would apply."' 18 What follows for
authority is introduced by the weakest of symbols - "see" 19 and
concludes, as would be appropriate, with the famous dicta of
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. This thought, coming almost as a
partial repudiation of the Court's then recent decisions repudiating
the Lochner era,2 1 was to herald a new look at governmental action
that interfered with the normal workings of the political process.
The Court itself may have been unaware of the far reaching
potential consequences of its dicta in the detailed footnote. For the
next time that Carolene Products was cited, it followed the
unremarkable statement that Athe determination of the legislature
is presumed to be supported by facts known it, unless facts
judicially known or proved preclude that possibility., 22 Carolene
Products was merely part of a string citation stating the new
standard of rationality and differential review.
When the Court next considered the Carolene Products
18 Id.
19 "'See' is used instead of '[no signal]' when the proposition is not directly
stated by the cited authority but obviously follows from it: there is an
inferential step between the authority cited and the proposition it supports."
THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (COLUM. L. REV. Ass'n et
al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
20 304 U.S. at 152.
21 Nebbis v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) & West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) repudiating analytical basis of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22 Clark v. Gray, 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939); see also Sage Stores Co. v.
Kansas, 323 U.S. 32, 35 (1944).
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footnote, it was not in the context of a successful Equal Protection
Clause challenge to the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act in Skinner v. Oklahoma.23 Rather, it was in the concurring
opinion of now elevated Chief Justice Stone that the footnote was
revisited as it applies to the presumption of constitutionality of
certain legislative acts on Due Process Clause grounds. 24 Chief
Justice Stone focuses upon the liberty of the person
concerned., 25 Justice Jackson concurs in finding that both equal
protection and due process protection are implicated, by
concluding, "there are limits to the extent to which a legislatively
represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a
minority ...,26
The stage was set for the broader protection of
"minorities," on either due process or equal protection grounds.27
Ironically, the Carolene Product's footnote was used by Justice
Black (who did not agree to it in Carolene Products)28 in his
dissenting opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 9 where the Court held the state flag salute statute
unconstitutional as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses.
Finally, if the Carolene Products footnote was to have
meaning, the internment of Japanese-American citizens would
23 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
24 Id. at 544-45 (Stone, C.J. concurring).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 546-47 (Jackson, J. concurring).
27 Of course, a significant problem exists in finding equal protection
safeguards within the Fifth Amendment, the prong under which the
plurality was writing in Carolene Products. The Court would hold in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the companion case to Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that an implicit equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment existed to
hold unconstitutional the Act of Congress racially segregating the public
schools of the District of Columbia.
28 Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 359; Lovell, 303 U.S. at 444.
29 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Black, J. dissenting); see also Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 484 (1944) (Rutledge, J. dissenting).
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seem to have been the ideal case for development of the failure of
the political processes to protect such persons, even though citizens
of nationalities of other Axis powers (e.g., German, Italian) were
treated as if they were presumptively loyal. Nowhere in any of the
Court' s opinions had any mention been made of the now famous
footnote.
3 1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT SCRUTINY OF
SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS BY THE COURT
From this modest beginning, the Court modified and
developed its theoretical underpinnings of strict scrutiny of a
growing, but modest, list of suspect classifications.
Classifications must be viewed in their elastic historical
relation to legislative, judicial and social morals of the United
States. These changes have altered how governments operate in
relation to providing all classes of persons' fundamental rights and
access to those rights, while concurrently not denying persons of
equal protection of all laws based upon classifications.
In addition to the race-based classifications already
discussed, alienage, 33 illegitimacy,34 gender, 35 and, when coupled
31 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
32 Surprisingly, in a recent case calling for the application of strict scrutiny,
the Supreme Court retreated to an unusual use of mere rationality of a state
constitutional ballot initiative designed to reduce political rights of gay
citizens. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995). Compare the decision in the
case below where the Supreme Court of Colorado relied explicitly upon
strict scrutiny analysis. Romer v. Evans, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
33 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare benefits may not be
denied to aliens), relying upon Carolene Products and Takahashi v. Fish
and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). Later cases seem to have
focused more directly on a Supremacy Clause rather than the Equal
Protection Clause analysis. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that
state law denying in-state tuition and fees to non-immigrant aliens was
preempted by Congress violated the Supremacy Clause).
2002-2003
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with some other constitutional right which could not be enjoyed,
indigency might be considered suspect as well.36  Mental
retardation has been considered a quasi-suspect classification, not
rising to warrant full protection from the Court.37 Many other
groups have cried out, unsuccessfully, for attention.38
It is significant that in this process of classification, once
34 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
35 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
36 Indigency has been coupled normally with criminal defendant's rights under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Robinson v. Henderson, 316 F. Supp.
1241 (1970). Similarly, court issues have emphasized state monopolies
affecting fundamental rights, such as the right to obtain a divorce. Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Ironically, such solicitous treatment
of criminal defendants' rights has not been made for poor women's
fundamental rights to reproductive choice and abortion. Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977).
37 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
38 See generally Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (residency); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (indigency alone is insufficient);
Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age); Marshall
v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (repeat offenders or drug addicts
demanding treatments); Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma
City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984) (sexual partners). See Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (conscientious objectors); Villanueva v.
Carere, 85 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 1996) (culture); Smallwood v. Johnson, 73
F.3d 1343 (5th Cir. 1996) (theft offenders); Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183
(5th Cir. 1994) (in forma pauperis litigants); Beauchamp v. Murphy, 37
F.3d 700 (1st Cir. 1994) (prison escapees versus other fugitives); Kreimer v.
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992) (homelessness); Lupert v.
California State Bar, 71 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) (students of unaccredited
law schools); Jones v. Reagan, 748 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1984) (seamen);
Baldwin v. City of Winston-Salem, 710 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1983)
(annexation and taxes); Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250
(9th Cir. 1974) (wealth); Vance v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826 (N.D.
Tex. 1977) (weight and military caste); Schultz v. New York State
Executive, 960 F. Supp. 568 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (non-framers); Boyd v.
Bulala, 751 F.Supp. 576 (W.D. Va. 1990) (medical malpractice cap);
United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(juvenile delinquency); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding
there is no compelling state interest requiring heterosexual marriage).
Selective Strict Scrutiny
the classifier is accepted as suspect, it appears suspect for all
purposes. Race is the prime culprit. While the early cases may be
excused from discussing race in a general sort of way, such as in
the context of a Virginia statute proscribing certain (but not all)
mixed-race marriages, the true import of such a case is that the
majority white race was interested in maintaining its alleged racial
purity.39 Such a state law had to have an impact upon whites
because it was only the sexual union of a white and black that was
of concern.
This sloppy analysis would ultimately sound the doom of
racially-motivated beneficial programs for African-Americans
except under the most trying and exacting circumstances.4 0
Eventually, some federal courts of appeals ended racial preferences
in educational admissions policies.4' Similarly, racial
gerrymandering in electoral districts subject to the Voting Rights
Act is now being routinely rejected if the racial motivation
predominates. 42 Not surprisingly, given our history with regard to
African-Americans, we find once again that success within the
political process to obtain a beneficial federal voting statute is now
not permitted. This is somewhat anomalous given that districts are
approved routinely, wherein entrenched or challenging (depending
what political party is in charge of reapportionment) Italian, Irish,
Jewish, or other constituencies are protected.
What all of this suggests is the need for a new model, a
model which is moored in the political insight of the Carolene
39 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
40 Trace the development of cases from Regents of Univ. of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), through Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980) and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989), to Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
42 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996);
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
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Products Court and uses that insight in discrete, concrete
circumstances. The model should be designed to afford relief to
burdensome and onerous political discrimination to a discrete
group, unable to mobilize over time the political process for its
own ends.
SELECTIVE SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AND THE
MODEL
As can be seen from the examples set forth above, strict
scrutiny need not be a universal model for all issues involving
groups that might sometimes qualify as suspect classes.
Developmentally disabled or mentally retarded persons might
never have the opportunity to locate a group home in some
communities, but could work successfully with other members of a
coalition at the national level. Thus, within the context of national
politics, the normal rules of sometimes winning and sometimes
losing would apply. Systemic institutional limitations upon access
of certain groups to participate might suggest that heightened
scrutiny would be appropriate. If structural barriers were few or
did not exist, though, then one should rely upon the impulses of the
majority in political process in a constitutional democracy.
The Court already embraced part of this concept when it
struck down initiatives, usually ballot-box voter initiatives, that
tended to reorganize the political process to the detriment of
successful minority group efforts at different levels of government.
Zoning43 and targeted changes in the authority of local boards of
education are prime examples. 4
These cases give us the kernel of a modest proposal of
moving forward with this new, limited concept. One key ingredient
is the change of a governmental power at one level that has the
effect of reburdening or disadvantaging the discrete group. This is
important because under equal protection analysis, we can usually
43 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
44 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); see also Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Vol. XXI
Selective Strict Scrutiny
rely upon the self-interests of the political majority to protect itself
at all levels of government. That protection might then translate
into an equal protection right for all citizens who "tag along" with
the majority's self-interested enactments. Changing the school
boards' powers in Washington, but only with regard to busing to
achieve racial balance, is the prime example of an event which
might trigger strict scrutiny. Another factor to consider is that
some discrete groups, perhaps not presently thought to be in a
suspect class, cannot act to protect their interests. In close electoral
matters, one might conclude from an analysis of the numbers that
the participation of the group would have had the effect of
changing the political system's decision; certainly a group cannot
be isolated and removed when the political majority does not care
for the group's views. The disparate impact of Title VII45
addresses conditions that should protect those individuals affected
by decisions of the political majority and/or decisions of the
government that may violate the rights of those minorities.46
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL
While many examples exist, perhaps a specific illustration
of how this process might work would be helpful. The Department
of Justice has published statistics showing the percentage bX race
or gender of those who might expect to spend time in prison.
45 Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equal. v. Bach, 611 F. Supp. 166 (Colo. 1985).
46 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).
47 Research, Development and Statistics Dictorate, Statistics on Race and the
Criminal Justice System (1999), at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/s95race99.pdf.#
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Black men 28.5
Latino men 16.0
White men 4.0
All women 1.0
All men 9.0
Vol. XXI
Similarly, for the year 1990, the Sentencing Project
determined that on any given day, 32.2 percent of all African-
American males in the 20-29 age bracket were under criminal
justice supervision (prison, jail, probation or parole). In 1993,
African-Americans constituted 13 percent of all monthly drug
users, 35 percent of those arrested for drug possession, 55 percent
of convictions, and 74 percent of prison sentences.48
The data of Ohio, a representative state, reflects similar
information in an illustrative year:
48 Marc Mauer & Tracy Huling, The Sentencing Project, Young Black
Americans and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later, in THE
SENTENCING PROJECT 1,12 (Oct. 1995).
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Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
Facts, Figures and Statistics:
Profile of Ohio Prisoners
49
Inmate
Commitments
during FY 1996 Inmate Population
(Source: Fiscal 19,556 on 7/1/96 45,167
Year 1996 (Source: 7/1/96
Commitment Census Report)
Report)
Sex Sex
Males: 17,038 Males: 42,357
Females: 2,518 Females: 2,810
Race Race
Black: 10,765 Black: 24,514
White: 8,318 White: 19,621
White Hispanic: 205 White Hispanic: 560
Black Hispanic: 31 Black Hispanic: 172
Native American: 18 Native American: 41
Asian: 10 Asian: 27
Other: 209 Other: 232
How does this translate into voting? One in seven (14
percent) African-American males are either currently or
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REP. (1996), Profile of Ohio Prisoners.
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permanently disenfranchised from voting as a result of a felony
conviction. Fox Butterfield of the New York Times News Service
has noted that the huge number of black men disenfranchised by a
felony conviction "clearly diminishes black influence politically"
and may contribute to the fact that black voter turnout is 10 to 20
percent lower than white turnout.
50
The illustrative data set forth above demonstrates the
significant impact of the loss of voting rights by a sizeable
African-American male populace. While the African-American
population votes at a lower rate than the majority population, 5 1 the
incremental presence of this voting block may well have profound
political consequences on issues that are important to that
constituency.
Similarly, African-American voters in the District of
Columbia, evaluated as a center of crime, voted to retain the law
abolishing the death penalty. 52 Notwithstanding that judgment,
Congress, in the exercise of its plenary authority over the District
of Columbia, was determined to enact capital punishment for the
District of Columbia. That is, in spite of the overwhelming
response of the constituents, Congress elected to maintain the
death penalty, thereby refusing to follow the voice of the
electorate, further alienating the people from their leadership. 53
Another example is the attempt by the Council of the
District of Columbia in 1963 to repeal the criminalization of
consensual sodomy, only to have its efforts turned back by
Congress exercising its plenary authority over the nation's
capital.54 The national policy process allowed members of
50 Fox Butterfield, Many Black Men Are Barredfrom Voting, N.Y. Times, Jan.
30, 1997, at A12.
51 Tony Hill, Where Do We Go from Here? The Politics of Black Education
1780-1980,6 B. REV. 11, 11-13 (1981).
52 William Schneider, Political Pulse: Growing Doubt about the Death
Penalty, The Atlantic Online (June 14, 2000), at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/pj/scheider2000-O6-14.htm.
Id.
54 Amending Dist. of Columbia's Charitable Solicitation Act: Hearings
Before Subcomm. on the Dist. of Columbia House of Rep., 88th Cong. 22-
Vol. XXI
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Congress to oppose the local citizenry's sense of priorities while
catering to their own constituents, who would never have to bear
the brunt of their representatives' policies for the District of
Columbia.55
A further example of an area where selective strict scrutiny
may be beneficial is in evaluating the outcome of a racially close
election. The Supreme Court has held that a state can
disenfranchise persons convicted of a felony. 56 The convicted
felons in that racial group have been disenfranchised and thus
barred from the electoral pool. 57
This disenfranchisement is a direct dilution of the voting
pool.5 8 The likelihood of a shift in the outcome of an election
because of voter disenfranchisement is due to the dilution of
minority voting strength. 59 The assumption is, however, that these
felons would have .voted if given the opportunity. 60 This also
presumes that disenfranchisement of the voting privilege is
weighed more heavily on one racial group compared to another.
61
Lower socioeconomic groups have been evaluated as
having a higher percentage of convicted felons,62 and these felons
may have otherwise voted but for their disenfranchisement. 63 The
disenfranchisement thus becomes a culling process of otherwise
legitimate voters and thereby dilutes the voter pool. 64
93 (1963) (statement of Dr. Franklin E. Kameny).
55 Modernization of Antigay Attitudes in Repeal of Sodomy Law, 103d Cong.
(1993).
56 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.24 (1974).
57 See Butterfield, supra note 50.
58 See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
Id.
60 See Richardson, supra note 56.
61 Cf Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38 (1986).
62 See Mauer, supra note 48, at 3.
63 Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 807 (1985).
64 , ,
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If racial minorities are considered a suspect group, this
disenfranchisement then places a disproportionately negative
impact on the suspect group.65 This occurs without overt
discriminatory intent; however, the disproportionate racial impact
could establish a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.
66
Purposeful discrimination against minorities, especially
blacks, to dilute the voting pool establishes that "blacks have less
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
candidates of their choice." 67 This is further compounded by the
voting disenfranchisement of the felons which effectively
decreases the blacks' opportunities to participate in the election
process and may shift the outcome of an election.68
"Disproportionate racial impact of felon
disenfranchisement on a minority voting population does not
establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act absent other reasons
to find discrimination. ' '69  While disenfranchisement may not
discriminate in the specific context of overt racial basis, there is an
element of "inten[t] to discriminate on the basis of race and other
suspect criteria. [S]tatutes that deny felons the right to vote are not
subject to strict scrutiny. ' 71
We have established that dilution of the voting pool may be
an insidious form of discrimination 71 and this is particularly
important in elections that are racially polarized.7 One can
analogize the significance of this dilution when considering issues
of concern to disenfranchised felons, such as the application of the
65 Cf Mauer, supra note 48.
66 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-431.
67 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 623, 624 (1982).
68 Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1313 (E.D. Wa. 1997).
69 Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
70 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54-56.
71 See, e.g., Allen, 393 U.S. 544.
72 Farrakhan, 987 F. Supp. at 1312.
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death penalty. 73
CONCLUSION
In this article I have attempted to set forth an alternative
approach to using suspect classifications. The approach proposed
seems to be truer to the profound insight of the Carolene Products'
authors to balance, from time to time, the imperfections in the
majority political process towards discrete minorities. Judicial
intervention is never perfect, but, on occasion, it serves as an
effective counterweight to the majority' s discriminatory impulses.
Perhaps this modest approach will allow reliance upon the political
process, other than on occasional moments when the political
process causes constituencies not to be breached.
See Hill, supra note 51.
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